Scan a Web Page for Open Redirect Vulnerabilities

Enter a public page. Scan.now discovers redirect, return, next, destination and callback parameters in same-origin links and GET forms, then checks the Location response without following an external target.

A normal page URL is enough. Scan.now discovers redirect-like public GET inputs on that page; paste an exact parameterized URL only when the forwarding feature is not linked there.

A registered account is required to run this test. Finding status, evidence, affected locations and remediation are Premium-only. How active scanning works · Acceptable use

Why an open redirect is more than a harmless forwarding page

Login, payment and campaign flows often accept a destination so the visitor can return to the page they originally wanted. An open redirect exists when an attacker can replace that destination with an arbitrary external site while the trusted domain still supplies the first link.

You can enter a normal page URL. Scan.now discovers same-origin parameterised links and public GET forms, selects only redirect-like input names, substitutes a controlled HTTPS destination and inspects the response's Location header without following the external redirect. This keeps the check bounded while distinguishing a real server redirect from a parameter that is merely displayed or ignored.

Destination inputs and Location headers

The check is deliberately bounded to the signals below.

Coverage areaWhat the scanner examines
Automatic redirect-input discoverySame-origin links and public GET forms are inspected for names such as next, return, destination, continue and callback; unrelated search and content fields are not probed.
HTTP redirect evidenceThe result is based on a returned Location header that resolves to the controlled external hostname.
No external navigationRedirect following is disabled for the probe, so Scan.now records the decision without requesting the destination.

External, rejected and undiscovered destinations

A scan result is evidence with a boundary, not a guarantee about every route.

External redirect accepted

The application turned the controlled external value into a redirect. Review phishing, OAuth and login-return flows that trust this endpoint.

No redirect accepted

The tested redirect-like parameters stayed internal, were rejected or were ignored. Client-side JavaScript redirects may still require browser testing.

No redirect input discovered

The entered page exposed no redirect-like public GET input. Paste a known forwarding endpoint if it is not linked there, or scan the page where that input is visible.

Relative paths, destination maps and strict allow-lists

Use the recommendations below to address confirmed findings and strengthen the surrounding control.

  1. Prefer relative destinations

    Accept an application path such as /account rather than a complete URL whenever the flow never needs to leave the site.

  2. Map identifiers to destinations

    Use a server-side key such as destination=billing and resolve it to a fixed route instead of trusting a supplied URL.

  3. Canonicalise before allow-listing

    Parse once, require HTTPS, compare the exact hostname and port, and reject user-info, encoded separators and ambiguous host suffixes.

  4. Bind OAuth return locations

    Register exact redirect URIs and tie the state value to the initiating browser session rather than accepting a loose domain match.

  5. Make unavoidable exits explicit

    For genuinely external links, show the destination hostname and require a deliberate click instead of redirecting automatically.

How it works

  1. Enter the relevant public page

    A normal page URL works. Paste an exact forwarding endpoint only when it is not linked or exposed by a public GET form on that page.

  2. We discover redirect-like values

    Same-origin links and public GET forms are inventoried, then a controlled HTTPS destination replaces only redirect-shaped values.

  3. The Location decision is checked

    The report distinguishes a confirmed external redirect from a rejected, ignored or internal destination.

What this tool checks

1 checks across 1 areas. Each links to its reference page with the test, the risk and the fix.

Full reference

Page content and JavaScript

1 check

The ones that most often decide the grade:

Guides for this tool

Background reading written to go with these results.

Frequently asked questions

Why are open redirects used in phishing?

The link begins on a familiar trusted hostname, so a person or filter may approve it before the browser is forwarded to the attacker's site.

Is redirecting to another subdomain safe?

Only if that subdomain is intentionally trusted and equally controlled. A suffix check such as endswith(example.com) is not enough unless hostname boundaries and canonicalisation are handled correctly.

Does the scanner visit the external destination?

No. It inspects the redirect response with following disabled, so the controlled destination is never loaded.

Are all external redirects vulnerabilities?

No. Some products intentionally leave the site. The security issue is an attacker-controlled automatic redirect presented under a trusted origin without a strict allow-list or clear interstitial.